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ThE LAND CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE: GETrING BEYOND THE
MYOPIC Focus UPON BLACK & WHITE
Thomas W. Mitchell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout Zimbabwe, people from all walks of life still dream of
obtaining land. One recent survey has indicated that no less than 67% of the
population would like to become farmers.' However, from independence in
1980,' until the present, the government has only made small inroads into
providing land to landless Zimbabweans or those living on marginal land.
More than twenty years after independence, 4500 white-owned commercial
farms are located upon approximately one-third of the country's agricultural
land and are situated upon the best farming land in the country. The current
distribution of land is one of the most obvious enduring legacies of the
colonial period.3 The lopsided distribution of land is a frustrating reality for
many rural peasants who supported the freedom-fighters during the war of
* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; B.A., Amherst College,
1987; J.D., Howard University School of Law, 1993; L.L.M., University of Wisconsin Law
School, 1999. 1 would like to thank Mike Roth from the Land Tenure Center at the University
of Wisconsin - Madison and John Bruce for their assistance as I began to formulate the ideas
for this Article. I would also like to thank Bill Kinsey from the Free University Amsterdam and
my colleague, Heinz Klug, for carefully reviewing my manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank
the Land Tenure Center for affording me the opportunity to travel to Zimbabwe in March, 2000.
1. R.W. Johnson, The Helen Suzman Foundation, Political Opinion and the Crisis of
Zimbabwe 43 (2000). Bill Kinsey, Senior Research Fellow, Free University Amsterdam, has
commented that the Helen Suzman Foundation survey appears to overstate significantly the
percentage of Zimbabweans who aspire to be farmers in light of other surveys-including ones
he has conducted--that have concluded that only a small percentage of Zimbabweans would
like to be farmers. See Email correspondence between Thomas Mitchell and Bill H. Kinsey,
Senior Research Fellow, Free University Amsterdam (June 24, 2001) (on file with author).
2. Carolyn Jenkins, The Politics of Economic Policy-Making in Zimbabwe, 35 J. Mod.
Afr. Stud. 575 n.l (1997).
3. In 1890, a small army of "pioneers," hired by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa
Company, laid claim to Mashonaland which is located in present day Zimbabwe. See ANTONY
THOMAS, RHODES: THE RACE FOR AFRICA 220 (1996). Rhodes paid his soldiers by granting
land and mining claims to them. See id. at 220-21. Several years later, the British South Africa
Company set aside the most productive lands for European settlement. See Michael R. Roth
& John W. Bruce, Land Tenure, Agrarian Structure, and Comparative Land Use Efficiency in
Zimbabwe: Options for Land Tenure Reform and Land Redistribution 1 (1994) (unpublished
LTC Research Paper 117)(on file with author). Eight years after Rhodesia obtained self-
government in 1923, enactment of the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 formalized the
segregation of land between whites and blacks. Under the Act. 19.7 million hectares of land,
including the overwhelming percentage of the best agricultural land were designated as
"European" lands; 11.6 million hectares were set aside as African reserves. Id.
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independence because they were promised that the land would be theirs upon
obtaining independence. Ever since Zimbabwe won its independence in 1980,
the unresolved-some would say neglected-land question has tended to re-
emerge on the political scene shortly before parliamentary or presidential
elections.4 At the end of February 2000, Zimbabwe suddenly became the
focus of international media attention after hundreds of Zimbabweans,
claiming to be veterans of Zimbabwe's war of independence, began occupying
parts of white-owned commercial farms.' In the past year, war veterans and
others have occupied as many as 1700 white commercial farms.6 Currently,
approximately 900 white-owned farms remain occupied.7 Overall, forty
people were killed in the wake of the farm invasions, thirty-four black
Zimbabweans and six white farmers.'
Despite the attention these murders have received, violence on white-
owned farms is not limited to Zimbabwe. Since 1995, almost 500 white
4. See ISAAC MAPOSA, LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAND
ACQUISITION ACT (1992) COMBINED WITH A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE RESErTLEE NT
PROGRAMME 20 (1995). See also Bill H. Kinsey, Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging
Evidence from Zimbabwe 's Resettlement Programme, 25 J. S. AFR. STuD. 173, 174 (1999). The
events leading up to last year's parliamentary election proved to be exceptional mostly in the
degree to which the land issue took center stage.
5. See, e.g., Basildon Peta, The New Enemies of the State: Reporters, As Foreign
Journalists- Face Expulsion from Zimbabwe, Basildon Peta Reports from Harare on the
Dangers Confronting the Press, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 20, 2001, at 8.
6. Ann M. Simmons, White Farmers Protest Forced Land Transfer, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2001, at Al. Although this round of farm invasions has received a great deal of attention,
there have been other periods since independence in which Zimbabwean peasants have invaded
farms. In the past, the government has responded somewhat ambivalently to such land
invasions. In the initial years after independence, the government tolerated peasant invasions
of land that had been abandoned or purchased by the state. However, the government did not
tolerate invasions that threatened the white, commercial farming sector. See LAWRENCE
TSHUMA, A MATTEROF(IN)JUSTICE: LAW, STATE AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE
62 (1997). By December of 1982, the government had declared a zero tolerance policy toward
land invaders and ordered squatters to vacate the land by early 1983. Rachael Knight, "We are
Tired of Promises, Tired of Waiting": People's Power, Local Politics and the Fight for Land
in Zimbabwe 99 (1999) (unpublished thesis, Brown University 1999)(on file with author). As
recently as 1998, a new round of commercial farm invasions erupted, which began with an
invasion of a commercial farm located in the Mashonaland East Province by a group of peasants
from an area called Svosve. Id. at 25. In November 1998, 600 rural villagers and war veterans
invaded five commercial farms in a area called Juru, which is located one hour west of Harare.
Id. at 99. By the end of the month, the national chairman of the ruling party ordered the
invaders off of the farms. Id. at 44. Police in riot gear forcibly evicted the squatters and
arrested 12 of the invaders. Id
7. David Blair, Mugabe's Mobs Storm Firms With "White Link", THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 7, 2001, at 15.
8. Farmers Vow to Stay Put, AFRICA NEWS, Mar. 7, 2001, at Documents &
Commentary; R.W. Johnson, Mugabe, Mbeki, and Mandela's Shadow, THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, Spring 2001.
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farmers have been killed in South Africa.9 Hundreds of black farm laborers
and other rural black South Africans, "in turn, have been beaten, raped and
murdered by white farm owners, managers, and private security personnel."'"
Although fewer murders occurred on farms in Zimbabwe in the past year
than on farms in South Africa, a large number of Zimbabweans have been
victimized by crude acts of political violence, and many continue to live in
fear. " Supporters of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union -
Patriotic Front ('7ANU-PF"), have been accused of conducting mass
beatings, burning houses, and issuing death threats in an effort to intimidate
the fledgling opposition. 2 The leading independent newspaper in Zimbabwe,
a newspaper that has frequently criticized the government, was bombed on
January 28, 2001.3 Reports have shown that supporters of the opposition
party have also acted violently to intimidate voters.'4 Nevertheless, these acts
of violence by supporters of the opposition have occurred on a much smaller
scale than the violence attributed to the supporters of the ruling party.
In contrast to South Africa's problem with farm violence and implemen-
tation of its land reform program, Zimbabwe's land crisis has received more
international attention due to the fact that President Mugabe and ZANU-PF
have openly supported the farm invasions. 5 Critics of the government claim
that government support for the farm invasions demonstrates that it has
abandoned any commitment to the rule of law. There is no question that after
the Movement for Democratic Change ("MDC") nearly won in the June 2000
elections, despite the fact that it had been formed only months before, leaders
within ZANU-PF moved swiftly to consolidate their party's hold on power.
In February, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay was forced to resign after the
government, dissatisfied with several Supreme Court rulings, indicated that
9. See Angry White South Africans Bury Another Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at
A4.
10. Violence on South African Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,2001, at A14. Though not
widely reported in the international media, many white farmers in Zimbabwe have also had a
record of treating their farm employees in a brutal manner. See Ann M. Simmons, Hostages
of Hostilities in Their Homeland; Zimbabwe: Whites Decry Farm Seizures, L.A. TIMEs, Apr.
28, 2000, at Al.
11. See JOHNSON, supra note 1. at 35 (noting survey results that indicate 74% of the
population believe that they must be careful about expressing negative views about the
government due to fear that the government might seek to retaliate by harming them).
12. See R.W. JOHNSON, THE HELENSUZMAN FOUNDATION, ZIMBABWE: THE HARD ROAD
TO DEMOCRACY 5 (2000).
13. See R.W. Johnson, Mugabe, Mbeki, and Mandela's Shadow, THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, Spring 2001.
14. See Rosie DiManno, In Zimbabwe Change Is Just a Word..., THE TORONTO STAR,
Mar. 26, 2001.
15. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 5. Reports indicated that the government paid the
people invading the white-owned farms and transported them in government vehicles from farm
to farm. See Kurt Shillinger, New Crackdown Starts in Zimbabwe, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
18, 2001, at A7.
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it would not guarantee his personal safety.'6 In April, the government passed
a law making it illegal for political parties in Zimbabwe to receive financial
contributions from foreign sources.'
Notwithstanding the real difficulties that a few thousand white farmers
in Zimbabwe have endured over the past year, the more fundamental and
enduring land problem in Zimbabwe still remains - more than twenty years
after independence - the question of providing access to land to the hundreds
of thousands of Zimbabweans who are landless or who have been confined to
living on overcrowded marginal-land in the communal areas. The more
compelling and enduring story of hundreds of thousands of poor, black
Zimbabweans with insufficient land has not garnered nearly as much media
attention as the farm invasions. As even government officials in Zimbabwe
will acknowledge, the government's efforts since independence to provide
land to landless and poor Zimbabweans have fallen well short of the
governmental targets.' 8
Nevertheless, a recent study has demonstrated that the government's
resettlement program has significant potential for alleviating poverty in the
overcrowded and impoverished areas. However, the limited number of
families resettled in Zimbabwe since independence represent a very small
percentage of Zimbabweans who need access to good land. Addressing the
critical land needs of these hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans in a
manner that respects the rule of law will require a great deal of financial
resources, technical support, and patience.'9
This Article is written with the limited objective of providing readers
with some background into the current land and political crisis in Zimbabwe.
Although there is certainly a racial component to the issue, the land question
in Zimbabwe is more complicated than a struggle between an oppressed black
majority and a privileged white minority. The manner in which the interna-
tional media has covered the land crisis in Zimbabwe has shed more heat than
light. First, this Article will provide a brief profile of the agrarian sector
within Zimbabwe. Second, this Article will review the main land resettlement
initiatives that have been undertaken by the government of Zimbabwe from
independence in 1980 until the present. Third, this Article will discuss the
land use efficiency and agricultural productivity in the communal areas and
largescale commercial sectors. In conclusion, this Article discusses some of
16. See 2 More Judges Face Ire of Government, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, IA), Feb.
11,2001, at AI2. The government has asked two more Supreme Court justices to resign and
plans to ask the remaining two justices on the five-member court to resign as well. See id.
17. See Biking the Samizdat, THE ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), Apr. 7, 2001, Int'l.
18. See Kinsey, supra note 4, at 174; see also Robin Palmer, Land Reform in Zimbabwe,
1980-1990, 89 AFR. AFr. 163, 173 (1990).
19. Vincent Kahiya, UNDP Report on Land Heading for Rejection, ZIMBABWE
INDEPENDENT, May 25, 2001 (estimating that a proper resettlement program that would
adequately reduce poverty will require 1 billion dollars).
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the challenges that lie ahead for Zimbabwe as it struggles to address the land
question in a political environment in which many other issues are competing
for attention.
II. ZIMBABWE: A PROFILE OF THE AGRARIAN SECTOR
Zimbabwe is a land locked country in Southern Africa. The country has
a population of more than twelve million people;' and at least 97% of the
population is black consisting mostly of the Shona and Ndebele people. The
white population makes up less than 2% of the population, a figure that
appears to be declining as many whites have been leaving the country over the
past year.2 Zimbabwe, one of the smaller countries in southern Africa, has
a total land area of thirty-nine million hectares (approximately 96 million
acres).22 In this mostly rural country, a little more than thirty-two million
hectares are devoted to the agricultural sector.23 Nearly 75 % of the population
earns their livelihood from agriculture.' Overall, the agricultural sector
generates about 15% of the gross domestic product, and agricultural exports
constitute 50% of export earnings for the country."
As is the case with almost every aspect of life in Zimbabwe, the agrarian
sector is highly dualistic, with land distributed unevenly between blacks and
whites.2 6 There are approximately 4800 large- scale commercial farms that are
located on almost eleven million hectares of land.27 Of the total number of
large-scale commercial farms, nearly 4500 are white-owned. As recently as
1989, these large-scale farms employed nearly 250,000 permanent and
seasonal employees.28 Many of the remaining large-scale farms have been
acquired by members of the new or emerging black elite, including politicians
and government officials, even though many of these farms were acquired for
the stated purpose of resettling the poor.29
20. See MARTINWHITESIDE, ENCOURAGING SUSTAINABLE SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE
IN SOUTHERN ZIMBABWE 10 (1998).
21. See Rachel L. Swains, As Zimbabwe Falters, Doubts About Who is Really to Blame,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2000, at A 1. The number of whites is shrinking daily as many whites, and
some black Zimbabweans with means, have decided to move out of the country in the past year.
22. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 112, n.27. There are approximately 2.47 acres to
a hectare. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 733 (10th ed. 1999).
23. See WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 15.
24. See id. at 12.
25. See id; Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 2.
26. WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 10. Other sectors of the economy such as the mining,
tourism, manufacturing, and financial services sectors exhibit similar imbalances, highlighting
the fact that more than twenty years after independence the colonial legacy survives. See
MAPOSA, supra note 4, at 24.
27. WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 15.
28. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 169.
29. See WHrrESIDE, supra note 20, at 14; Mugabe Defends Farm Allocations to Ministers,
XINI-UA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2000, World News.
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In contrast, one million Shona and Ndbele families live on sixteen
million hectares in the exclusively black communal areas. Recent statistics
indicate that large-scale farms averages 2223 hectares; 3° as of 198 1, the large-
scale commercial farms owned by corporations or multinationals averaged
3835 hectares, as compared to the commercial farms owned by individuals or
families that averaged 1402 hectares.3 In contrast, the farms in the communal
areas average eighteen hectares, with each farm averaging only three to five
hectares of arable land.2 The population density in the communal areas is
thirty-eight people per one hundred hectares, which is three times the
population density on the large-scale commercial farms that have an overall
density of thirteen people per one hundred hectares.
33
In addition to the much higher population density in the communal areas
as opposed to the large-scale commercial sector, there are many other
qualitative differences between the two sectors. Due to the fact that the initial
European settlers took the best land for themselves, there are marked
differences between the quality of land that most black Zimbabweans farm
and the land owned by large-scale commercial farmers. Overall, the country
is divided into five "Natural Regions" that have different degrees of soil
quality, rainfall,34 and other climatic features that significantly impact a
farmer's ability to grow crops productively.3" In Natural Regions One and
Two, the regions that have the most rainfall and the best farming land, 74%
of the land used for farming is owned by large-scale commercial farmers.
s
3
Representing the mirror opposite, 74% of the land that is located in Natural
Regions Four and Five, the areas with the poorest rainfall, is communal area
land.37 Not only are there great differences in the amount of arable land the
commercial farmers own as opposed to communal area residents, soil erosion
occurs at a far higher rate in the communal areas as opposed to the commer-
cial farming areas, due to the overcrowding in the communal areas.38
Further, there are tremendous differences in the poverty rates found
within the different farming sectors. A 1995 study reported that 62% of the
30. See WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 15.
31. SAM MOYO, TlE LAND QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE 84 (1995).
32. See WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 15.
33. Id
34. Rainfall is the most important determinant of whether landis arable in Zimbabwe. See
M.W. MuRPHREE & D.H.M. CUMMING, SAVANNA LAND USE: POLICY AND PRACTICE IN
ZIMBABWE, CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND PAPER 6 (1991).
There is a single rainy season in Zimbabwe that lasts from November to March and about 65%
of the country receives less that 750 millimeters of rain per year. id.
35. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 8-9.
36. See WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 12-13.
37. See id. at 15; Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 19.
38. See MURPHREE & CUMMING, supra note 34, at 7.
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population nationwide was living below the poverty line.39 However, in the
communal areas, 81% of the people lived below the poverty line as compared
to 51% of the people residing in the large-scale commercial farming areas.
40
In addition to the large-scale commercial sector and the communal area
sector, which together account for nearly 85% of Zimbabwe's farming area,
there is a resettlement area sector and a small-scale commercial farming
sector, reserved for black small holders." The resettlement area consists
mostly of former large-scale commercial farmland that the government
acquired after independence for the stated purpose of resettling poor
Zimbabweans living in communal areas."2 Pre-independence, the small-scale
commercial farming areas were referred to as the native purchase areas and
subsequently the African purchase areas.43 These areas were established to
give black Zimbabweans some limited ability to purchase land in a black
sector because under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, blacks were barred
from buying land in the newly established white purchase areas. Only in the
native purchase areas were blacks permitted to purchase land, in 30 to 300
acre parcels, and hold such land under freehold title."
The dualistic structure of the agrarian sector extends to the land tenure
systems found within the different sectors. Ironically, the central government
has maintained at least as much control over land administration as did the
colonial government just prior to independence. 5 Individual black
Zimbabweans appear to own no more land under freehold title today than
blacks held during the colonial era. Freehold title has typically been used as
collateral for loans due to the fact that freehold has the characteristic of
unrestricted alienation.' The fact that institutions making agricultural loans
require the borrower to possess collateral partially explains the reasons why
large-scale farms have received two-thirds of the country's agricultural
39. See WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 11. The percentage of people living in poverty has
increased by almost one-third over the last decade as 40% of Zimbabweans lived in poverty at
the beginning of the 1990s. Swarns, supra note 21.
40. See WHITESIDE, supra note 20, at 11.
41. Small holders are landowners who own relatively small parcels of land as compared
with the other landowners in a given region or country. There are 3.29 million hectares of land
found in the resettlement sector and 1.38 million hectares that lie in the small scale commercial
areas. Id. at 15.
42. See 1 COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO APPROPRIATE AGRICULTURAL LAND TENURE
SYSTEMS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO APPROPRIATE AGRICULTURAL LAND
TENURE SYSTEMS, at 55 (1994) (commission chaired by Professor Mandivamba Rukuni)
[hereinafter the Rukuni Report].
43. See id. at 73.
44. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 14.
45. See ZERO-REGIONALENvIRONMENTORGANISATION, ENHANCING LAND REFORMS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA; CASE STUDIES ON LAND REFORM STRATEGIES AND COMMUNITY BASED
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 63 (1998).
46. Roth & Bruce, supra note 3. at 31.
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credit.47 Nevertheless, government officials in Zimbabwe remain skeptical
about the benefits of freehold tenure."8
Such skepticism may explain the government's resistence to providing
those established in the resettlement areas with the ability to own land under
freehold title. Instead, under the various resettlement schemes, including the
one that has been used most extensively, known as the Model A scheme, title
to the resettlement land vests in the state."9 In the first ten years or so of the
resettlement efforts, the government issued three types of permits to those
resettled under the Model A scheme: a permit to reside, a permit to cultivate,
and a permit to depasture livestock.' On paper at least, the permits gave the
government extraordinary power over those resettled who in turn possessed
relatively few rights. Kinsey indicates that the government stopped issuing
physical, paper permits in 1992 or so."
Although the government no longer appears to be issuing paper permits,
title to land in the resettlement areas still vests in the state. The precise
conditions under which those resettled since 1992 have access to the land is
somewhat murky. One thing, however, is more certain. Any farm invaders or
other Zimbabweans who are resettled on any of the farms the government may
acquire that are now being occupied, will likely receive access to the land
under some tenure system under which title vests in the state as opposed to
under freehold title.
The government also has significant control over land administration in
the communal areas. Under the Communal Lands Act of 1982 ("CLA"), land
allocation and administration was taken away from traditional leaders and
given to district councils, known currently as the Rural District Councils, who
report to the central government.52 Under the CLA, the President holds title
over communal areas in trust for the people.53 In its allocation of power with
respect to land administration, the Communal Lands Act of 1982 resembles
the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 ("NLHA").-4 The NLHA represented
a radical attempt by the Rhodesian government to replace traditional Shona
and Ndebele tenure systems with a system based upon Western concepts of
freehold tenure.5 Furthermore, the NLHA stripped traditional leaders of the
47. See id. at 31-32.
48. See id
49. See Rukuni Report, supra note 42, at 56.
50. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 51.
51. See Email correspondence between Thomas Mitchell and Bill H. Kinsey, Senior
Research Fellow, Free University Amsterdam (June 24, 2001) (on file with author).
52. See 4. at 41.
53. See Rukuni Report, supra note 42, at 22.
54. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 38, 41.
55. See Rukuni Report, supra note 42, at 22. The NLHA was similar in important
respects to the General Allotment Actof 1887 (or "Dawes Act") that the UnitedStates Congress
adopted in the late nineteenth century in order to fundamentally alter the land tenure systems
on Native American reservations. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388,
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power to allocate and administer land and placed authority into the hands of
government officials.5 6 Under the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1965, traditional
leaders were given back the authority to allocate and administer land in the
reserves or tribal trust lands." Under the CLA, that authority has once again
been removed.
Ill. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESETLEMENT PROGRAMS
A. Review of the Government's Programs Since Independence
Over the past twenty years, the Zimbabwean government has launched
a series of land reform initiatives. However, as compared to South Africa
which undertook a broad range of land reform initiatives after the transition
to majority rule in 1994-including programs aimed at restitution, redistribu-
tion and improving land tenure security5 8-Zimbabwe' s land reform program
has been more one-dimensional. 9 From independence until last year, the
primary focus of the Zimbabwean government's land reform program had
been on resettlement of black families onto land sold by whites on a "willing
seller, willing buyer" basis. The policy decision to focus efforts on resettling
a few hundred thousand Zimbabweans has not responded adequately to the
land problems faced by millions of black Zimbabweans who live in the
overcrowded communal areas. Plans to rehabilitate the communal areas or to
reform the pattern of land tenure within the communal areas to provide the
people living there with more autonomy from government technocrats have
"not turned into reality on the ground" for the most part."'
(1887). Under the Dawes Act, Congress sought to break up Indian reservations by allocating
part of the reservation land to individual Indians and families and declaring the remainder as
"surplus land". Judith Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995). Not
only did Native American tribes lose millions of acres of land that was declared as "surplus
land" under the Dawes Act, but also a majority of the individual Indians who were given fee
simple ownership of land under the Act lost their land within a few years after they were preyed
upon by land speculators. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:
Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Throush Partition
Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 505, 542-43 (2001). Just as the Dawes Act
ended up being considered a failure with respect to its goal of creating Native American yeoman
farmers committed to a system of individualized, freehold tenure, implementation of the Native
Land Husbandry collapsed under fierce opposition from those living in the targeted areas. Cf
Roth and Bruce, supra note 3, at 41.
56. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 38.
57. See Rukuni Report, supra note 42, at 22.
58. See South Afr. Dep't of Land Affairs, White Paper on South African Land Policy 9
(1997).
59. See Kinsey, supra note 4, at 174 n. 5. See also Palmer, supra note 18, at 167-78.
60. See Palmer, supra note 18, at 167-68.
61. Id. at 168.
20011
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Under the Land Reform and Resettlement Program ("LRRP - 1"),
implemented between 1980 and 1997, the government resettled 71,000
households on approximately 3,500,000 hectares of land.62 This land
consisted mostly of land acquired from the commercial farming sector, with
some additional State-owned land. 3 The number of households resettled
represents less than10% of the communal area farmers and resettlement has
not kept pace with population growth."M Further, despite the resettlement of
these families, the government had set a goal in 1982 under its Transitional
National Development Plan of resettling 162,000 families on 9,000,000
hectares by the end of 1985.65 Not only was the government unable to meet
this goal, but recent reports indicate that 524,890 families have registered for
resettlement throughout the country.' Moreover, the government has not
provided all of the needed infrastructure to the LRRP-1 resettled families or
improved the "settlers" access to research, extension, and markets."'67
In 1997, the government announced that it would launch a second Land
Reform and Resettlement Program ("LRRP-2") with the goal of acquiring five
million hectares of land from the large-scale commercial farming sector and
resettling 150,000 families." This land acquisition and resettlement were to
be accomplished within a five-year period." However, political events
overtook implementation of the LRRP-2.
Prior to the June parliamentary elections, at a time in which ZANU-PF
held 147 out of the 150 seats, the parliament amended the constitution in a
manner that allowed the government to expropriate land without paying
compensation.7' On May 23, 2000, the government amended the Land
62. Inception Phase Framework Plan, 1999 to 2000: An Implementation Plan ofthe Land
Reform and Resettlement Programme, Phase 2/Technical Committee of the Inter-Ministerial
Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development National Economic Consultative Forum
Land Reform Task Force (Zimbabwe), 2nd draft (undated)(on file with author).
63. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 21.
64. See WHrrESIDE, supra note 20, at 54.
65. See TSHUMA, supra note 6, at 60.
66. See BriefforNegotiations on the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Between
the Zimbabwean and the British Governments, http:l/www.gta.gov.zw/Land%201ssues/
workingbrief.htm (last visited May 31, 2001).
67. Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 124. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the
percentage of national spending the government devoted to agriculture dropped from a high of
9.2% in the 1984/85 fiscal year to 1.9% in 1997/98 fiscal year. See WHrrEsIDE, supra note 20,
at App. III.
68. See Inception Phase, supra note 63. In addition to resettling families, the government
intended to allocate land to a number of black commercial farmers in an effort to increase
agricultural productivity. Id.
69. See id
70. See Zimbabwe: Market Land Acquisition Experience, AFRICA NEws, Nov. 27,2000,
at Documents & Commentary. Under the amendment, the' government is required to pay for
improvements; however, the government is allowed to offset previous subsidies the government
provided to the landowners. Id.
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Acquisition Act of 1992 ("LAA-1992"')71 to make it consistent with the
constitutional amendment. The amended LAA-1992 provides for compensa-
tion for the acquisition of agricultural land as follows: "In respect of the
acquisition of agricultural land required for resettlement purposes, compensa-
tion shall only be payable for any improvements on or to the land ... 72
On July 15, 2000, Vice President Joseph Msika announced the
commencement of the government's "Accelerated Land Reform and
Resettlement Implementation Plan" or the "fast-track" resettlement plan as it
has been commonly designated. 3 Under the fast-track plan, the government
now seeks to acquire five million hectares of land by December 2001."'
Compensation for land will be paid in accordance with the recent amendments
to the LAA-1992.75 The government has identified more than 3000 farms
located on slightly more than five million hectares of land that it intends to
acquire.7 Under the fast-track plan, the government has stated that its first
priority is to resettle poor landless people from congested communal areas and
then indigenous black Zimbabweans who wish to participate in the large-scale
commercial farming sector." Even the government has acknowledged that the
fast-track approach is flawed because the people resettled will be provided
with only the most basic infrastructure needed to use the land (presumably
beneficiaries will receive less support than beneficiaries received under
LRRP-1).
79
71. See Land Issues in Zimbabwe, New Land Acquisition Act, http://www.gta.gov.zw/
Land%20Issues/LAND.htm (last visited May 31, 2001) [hereinafter "Land 1V].
72. Id.
73. See Land Issues in Zimbabwe, Statement made by Vice President Joseph Msika on
Announcing the Accelerated Land Reform and Resettlement Programme "Fast Track"
Approach, July 15, 2000, http://www.gta.gov.zw/Land%201ssues/LAND.htm (last visited May
31, 2001) [hereinafter "Land 2"].
74. See Ministerial Pronouncements, Minister Mudenge Honours the UNDP
Administrator and Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Mark Malloch
Brown, Nov. 30, 2000, http://www.gta gov.zw/Ministerial%2Speeches /ministerial-speeches
main.htm.
75. See Land 1, supra note 71.
76. See Land Issues in Zimbabwe, Chairman of the National Land Acquisition
Committee: Hon. Vice President J. W. Msika Announces the Identification of Additional Farms
for the Resettlement Programme, July 31, 2000, http:t/www.gta.gov.zw/Land%201ssues/
LAND.htm (last visited May 31, 2001) [hereinafter "Land 3"].
77. See Land 2, supra note 73.
78. See Ministerial Pronouncements, supra note 74. "We shall not hide the fact that the
Fast Track Programme has room for improvement. For example, the settlers require access
roads, water supplies, schools, clinics, dip tanks, draught power, initial seeds and fertilisers,
extension services, training and many more which the Government is unable to provide at
present." Id at 15.
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B. Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Resettlement Efforts
An assessment of the government's resettlement program since
independence cannot be written in black and white or labeled a complete
success or failure. Although the program has not come close to fulfilling its
goals, thousands of poor and landless Zimbabweans have benefitted from the
resettlement program. At the same time, a number of well connected
Zimbabweans have been allocated land under the resettlement program that
the government claimed it had acquired in order to resettle the poor and
landless.
Despite the more limited focus of the land reform initiatives in
Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean resettlement program overshadows any other
voluntary resettlement program that has been undertaken in sub-Saharan
Africa.79 For example, the government has allocated significantly more land
to those resettled than the Kenyan government allocated to resettled families
under its resettlement program.80 Not only has the Zimbabwean resettlement
program been relatively impressive in terms of its scope as compared to other
such efforts, but it has also been somewhat successful in achieving some of
the early goals of the program with respect to improving the life chances of
those resettled."'
One of the leading research scientists who has tracked the beneficiaries
of the resettlement program in Zimbabwe has emphasized that the impact of
resettlement can only be measured over a fairly long time horizon." Further,
when measured against some of the programs initial poverty-alleviation goals
instead of against the productivity of the large-scale farming sector, the
resettlement program benefits become clearer.83 The more appropriate
comparison is between households in the communal areas and households in
the resettlement areas because most of those resettled have come from the
communal areas. Analysis of the data from the 1996 crop harvest revealed
that the value of the agricultural crops of the average resettled family was
worth over four and a half times the value of the crops produced by the
79. See Kinsey, supra note 4, at 177.
80. See Palmer, supra note 18, at 169.
81. The main objectives of the resettlement program at its inception were as follows: (1)
to alleviate population pressure in the communal areas; (2) to extend and improve the base for
productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector; (3) to improve the level of living of the
largest and poorest sector of the population; (4) to provide, at the lower end of the scale,
opportunities for people who have no land and who are without employment and may therefore
be classed as destitute; (5) to bring abandoned or under-utilised land into full production as one
facet of implementing an equitable programme of land redistribution; (6) to expand or improve
the infrastructure of economic production; and (7) to achieve national stability and progress in
a country that has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war. Kinsey, supra note 4, at 176.
82. Id. at 175.
83. See id. at 176.
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average communal area household. 4 Further analysis of the data also
revealed that resettled households earned almost seven times as much income
from the sale of their crops as the communal area households.5
Despite these markers of success of the resettlement program-
indicators that must be tempered by the small percentage of the poor and
landless who have benefitted from the program--there has also been a
recurrent pattern of large farms being allocated to members of the black elite
despite the fact that the government has mostly justified its resettlement
program as designed to acquire land for the teeming masses of the poor and
landless.86 In March 2000, the Zimbabwean parliament revealed that the
government had acquired and distributed 270 white-owned farms, presumably
acquired for redistribution to the poor, to 400 relatively privileged
Zimbabweans, some of whom served in the government." Unfortunately, the
allocation of these farms to well-heeled or connected Zimbabweans is not an
isolated event. In 1998, twenty-four farms that had been acquired from white
farmers were divided amongst forty-seven government officials.8 In 1994,
twenty farms acquired by the government were disbtibuted to high-ranking
government officials.8 9
IV. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL
FARMING SECTOR
The wisdom of redistributing significant amounts of land from white
farmers to poor native Zimbabweans has been questioned consistently by
many white farmers since independence.' Typically, those opposing the
government acqusition of white-owned farms claim that the large-scale
commercial farming sector, which is dominated by white farmers, is
significantly more efficient than the other farming sectors. Thus, it is believed
that redistributing commercial farmland to resettled blacks drawn from the
overcrowded communal areas will negatively impact agricultural productivity,
lowering foreign exchange earnings.9 Further, given the high percentage of
84. See id. at 183.
85. Id Resettled households, however, did not make much progress as compared to
communal area households with respect to child nutritional levels. li at 189-92.
86. See Jenkins, supra note 2, at 594-95.
87. See George Ayittey, What is Koigo Doing in the Company of Despots?, AFRICA
NEWS, May 11,2000, at Documents & Commentary.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Brian J. Nickerson, The Environmental Laws ofZimbabwe: A Unique Approach
to Management of the Environment, 14 B.C. THIRD WoRLD L.J. 189, 225 (1994).
91. See Roth & Bruce. supra note 3, at 1. Until recently at least, the most successful
organization that has lobbied against extensive land reform that would redistribute white-owned
farmland to poor black Zimbabweans has been the Commercial Farmers' Union. Palmer, supra
note 18. at 163. 170-71.
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persons employed in Zimbabwe who work as farm laborers on large-scale
commercial farms, there are serious and legitimate concerns that acqusition
of large numbers of white-owned farms may further exacerbate the country's
high unemployment rate.' Nevertheless, the perception that large-scale white
farms have been highly efficient is a common misconception.
One reason some believe that white-owned commercial farms are highly
efficient stems from the fact that large farms are assumed to be operated in a
way that takes advantage of economies of scale.93 However, a number of
empirical studies demonstrate that there is often an inverse relationship
between the scale of a farming operation and the productivity of the farm per
hectare for most crops.' In Zimbabwe, the large-scale commercial farming
"sector's substantial contribution to agricultural production and export
earnings mask a number of inefficiencies. '  For example, "[o]ne
multinational alone held 25 farms amounting to 500,000 hectares which were
mostly not cropped."9' Overall, at least 40 to 50% of the arable land in
Natural Regions One and Two has been unutilized for crop production.'- The
land in the third best Natural Region in terms of rainfall, Natural Region IlI,
"remains grossly underutilized at 15 percent."" Roth and Bruce have
indicated that within these three regions, 3.5 million hectares "could be
acquired for resettlement without sacrificing commercial crop output and/or
exports." 99 Kinsey, however, points out that the land to be acquired would
have to be carefully selected and that a feasible land subdivision or "land
92. Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 111.
93. In terms of the historical development of the dominant large-scale commercial sector,
it should be noted that between 1894-1980, the agricultural policy objectives were geared
towards building up white commercial farmers. Policymakers realized this objective by: (1)
providing land to white farmers either for free or below market value; (2) facilitating easy
access to credit for white farmers; (3) devoting resources to research and agricultural extension
programs that set up to benefit white farmers; and (4) regulating the agricultural sector through
controlling prices and providing subsidies. See MAPOSA, supra note 4, at 34-35. See also
TSHUMA, supra note 6, at 56-57. "[White commercial farms] have reached their present levels
of productivity and efficiency on the basis of lavish state support and protection from
competition. Moreover, their efficiency continues to be based on indirect subsidies of cheap
labour as evidenced by the poor conditions of employment for farm workers and the high levels
of malnutrition among their children." Ia
94. See Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 57-58. See also R. ALBERT BERRY AND WILLIAM
R. CLINE, AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND PRODUCrIVrrY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A STUDY
PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WORLD
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME 131, 134-35 (1979).
95. Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 101.
96. Market LandAcquisition, supra note 70.
97. Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 108.
98. Id at 106.
99. Id at 109.
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sharing" scheme would have to be established.'00 He notes that neither
precondition has been satisfied to date.' 0'
Further, the large-scale commercial sector's dominance does not extend
to all agricultural crops. After it achieved independence in 1980, the
Zimbabwean government "increased investment in rural infrastructure - in
input and marketing services and in extension - in the communal areas.... ,,"2
With these improvements and increased market access, communal area
farmers now hold a comparative advantage over large-scale commercial
farmers in the production of maize and sunflowers; and farmers in the two
sectors produce cotton on nearly equal terms.10 3  These developments
demonstrate that Zimbabwe's mostly poor black farmers can be as productive
as the large-scale commercial farmers if given the same level of support.
V. CONCLUSION
Given all of the media attention devoted to the farm invasions and the
overheated rhetoric about the land question, those unfamiliar with day-to-day
life in Zimbabwe may think that the land question is the biggest concern for
most Zimbabweans. However, Zimbabweans face many issues they consider
significantly more important than the land question. Twenty five percent of
the population is H.I.V. positive."° At least 30% of the population is now
unemployed. 5 In fact, the results of a poll conducted, by the South African-
based Helen Suzman Foundation in September to October 2000, indicate that
only 6% of Zimbabweans rate the land question as the country's most
important issue.1° This is just ahead of the 5% who believe government
corruption to be the country's leading problem.0 7 Given the fact that between
250,000 and 300,000 people are employed in the large-scale commercial
sector' °g and that many of these people do not believe the farm invasions will
lead to genuine land reform,"' it is not surprising that these farm employees
100. See Email correspondence between Thomas Mitchell and Bill H. Kinsey, Senior
Research Fellow, Free University Amsterdam (June 24, 2001) (on file with author).
101. Id
102. Id at 82.
103. See id at 99.
104. South Africa's Aid to Zimbabwe Must be Conditional, FINANCIAL MAIL (South
Africa), Mar. 23, 2001, at 14.
105. See WHrESIDE, supra note 20, at 97-98.
106. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 18.
107. See id. at 18. The land question ranked sixth amongst the concerns people expressed.
The following issues ranked ahead of the land question: rising prices (32%); unemployment
(19%); the drop in value of the Zimbabwe dollar (14%); poverty (8%); and HIV/AIDS (8%).
id.
108. Roth & Bruce, supra note 3, at 169; MOYO, supra note 31, at 98.
109. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 40. (in this survey, 64% of the respondents indicated
that the farm invasions were a mere political ploy that had nothing to do with genuine land
reform).
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fear that the farm invasions may lead to greater unemployment with no
corresponding benefit of effective land reform.
Further, those who have been following the land crisis in Zimbabwe
from afar should not assume that the majority of Zimbabweans support the
farm invasions. This may appear surprising given the degree to which the
issue of land distribution has become politicized in Zimbabwe. In a survey
conducted towards the end of 2000,68% of the respondents believed that the
self proclaimed war veterans should leave the farms they invaded immedi-
ately."' With respect to the role that white farmers should play, 69% of the
respondents indicated that they did not favor radical redistribution initiatives
that would drive white farmers off their land."' Even amongst the ZANU-PF
respondents to the survey, 47% did not favor radical redistribution that would
take away farms from whites." 2
Any lasting solution to the land question in Zimbabwe can only occur
in a less politically charged environment. Before the government imple-
mented its "fast-track" program, even many white farmers in Zimbabwe
acknowledged that a substantial number of white-owned commercial farms
would need to be acquired in order to decrease the highly skewed land
distribution patterns."' However, it is questionable whether the current
approach will deliver the benefits the government has promised.
Even if the government is able to relocate a significant number of the
more than 500,000 poor families who registered for resettlement onto formerly
white-owned commercial farms, those resettled probably will not benefit as
much as those who have already been resettled under earlier resettlement
initiatives. This is likely to be the case because the government acknowledges
that it will be able to provide those to be resettled with only the barest amount
of infrastructure and support.'14 Moreover, Zimbabwe's troubled economy
will likely suffer further downturns under the present conditions; and
economic declines will negatively impact people throughout the country,
including those resettled on farms acquired under the "fast-track" program.
The government of Zimbabwe must expand its land reform strategies
and programs to better meet the needs of its population. In terms of resettle-
ment, the government must adopt a process that requires government officials
110. See id at 41. See also Swains, supra note 21.
111. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 35.
112. See id
113. See Andrew Meldrum, African Leaders Criticise Mugabe for Farm Seizures, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 1,2000 ("Virtually everyone, including international donors and Zimbabwe's
white farmers, agree that thorough land reform is needed to redress the historic injustices in
which white British settlers seized vast tracts of African land without paying compensation.")
Id. See also, Rupert Cornwell, Zimbabwe: Land and Freedom: Only Both Will Do, THE
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 9. 2000.
114. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. See also John Dludlu, New Look Old
Problems for Mugabe, BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), Dec. 19, 2000.
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to consult with those to be resettled from the beginning of the resettlement
process instead of using the top-down approach that has often characterized
the resettlement program up to this point."' Beyond, the resettlement
program, the government must also consider making changes to the land
tenure laws that allocate rights and responsibilities between individuals,
groups and the government with respect to landownership and land use.
As in many other post-colonial countries, the Zimbabwean government
has maintained a dualistic land tenure system resembling tenure systems found
in colonial states. "' Whether extending freehold title throughout post-colonial
countries, such as Zimbabwe, would do much to give people more secure
property rights, referred to as improving security of tenure, is a hotly contested
issue." 7 The government of Zimbabwe, however, should consider relinquish-
ing some of its grip over those in the resettlement areas by providing resettled
individuals, groups and communities with more autonomy and ownership
rights.
Given that the current land reform crisis flared up months before a hotly
contested election, many Zimbabweans doubt whether the government's
initiatives will have much staying power beyond the presidential elections in
2002. Further, now that the leader of the war veterans - Chenjerai Hunzui -
has died, no one knows whether those who have participated in the farm
occupations will maintain their resolve."'8 The farm invasions in the past year
have unquestionably changed the parameters of the land debate both within
Zimbabwe and in countries such as South Africa. Whether or not the "fast-
track" program will help garner political support for President Mugabe and
ZANU-PF over the course of the next year, the effectiveness of the new
program - in the end - must be measured by the degree to which the lives
of poor and landless Zimbabweans are improved or not. Time will surely tell.
115. See Kinsey, supra note 4, at 173, 181.
116. Jane Borges, Land Reform Not Only Mugabe's Problem, AFRICA TODAY, Feb. 23,
1998 ("Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa have similar colonial-inspired dual-agrarian
systems - export orientated, large-scale farms and smallholder peasant farmers in communal
areas producing for local markets").
117. SEARCHINGFORLANDTENURESECURITY INAFRICA 24-27,137-39,260-64 (John W.
Bruce & Shem E. Migot-Adholla eds. 1994). See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE
MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAmLS EVERYWHERE
ELSE (2000) (arguing that developing countries should adopt Westem-style property systems
in order to unlock the economic potential of the poor).
118. Chenjerai Hunzvi, 51, Leader of Farm Take Overs in Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 2001, A25 (Obituaries).
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